Indiana Law Journal
Volume 81

Issue 1

Article 6

Winter 2006

The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing Device
Scott Baker
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, sbaker@email.unc.edu

Stephen J. Choi
New York University Law School, stephen.choi@nyu.edu

Mitu Gulati
Georgetown Law Center

Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Legal Education Commons

Recommended Citation
Baker, Scott; Choi, Stephen J.; and Gulati, Mitu (2006) "The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing Device,"
Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 81 : Iss. 1 , Article 6.
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol81/iss1/6

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open
access by the Law School Journals at Digital Repository
@ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please
contact rvaughan@indiana.edu.

The Rat Race as an Information-Forcing Devicet
ScoTT BAKER,* STEPHEN J. CHOI,

*

AND Mrru GULATI * *

In manyjob settings, there will be some promotion criteriathat are less amenable
to measurement than others. Often, what is difficult to measure is more important.For
example, possessing "goodjudgment" underpressure may be a betterpredictor of
success as a lawfirm partnerthan the ability to bill a vast amount of hours. The first
puzzle that this essay explores is why, in some promotion settings, organizations
appearto focus on less important,but measurable, criteriasuch as hours billed The
answerlies in the relationshipbetween the objectively measurablecriteria,on the one
hand,and the subjective and less visible (but more important)attributeson the other
hand. Under certain circumstances,a competition over the measurablecriteria,such
as hours billed or number of deals accomplished, can force the revelation of
information on hard-to-measure subjective attributes of the candidate such as
judgment or collegiality. For example, it is easier to evaluate the judgment of an
associate who has amassed a number of deals than one who has not. Some
information about the associate'sgood and badjudgment is likely to be generated
from the deals. So, while it makes little sense to promote associates based solely on
billable hours, making billable hours the goal of the first round of a tournament,
where the winners are awarded eligibility for considerationfor partnership, can
generate information more relevant to the second-roundpartnerselection decision.
Explainingthefirstpuzzle leads to a secondpuzzle. Ifpromotion tournamentsover
measurablecriteriacan be effectively utilized in the privatesector to force information
about candidatetraits, why do we not see revelation tournaments elsewhere, where
competition may generate information useful in evaluatingcandidatesforpromotion?
The answer, we suggest, has to do at least in part with agencyproblems. Promotion
tournaments based on measurable criterialimit the discretion ofagents making the
promotion decisions. When decision makers have less discretion, the return to
curryingfavor with those decision makersfalls. As a result, decision makers with less
discretionearn less "rent."Decision makers acting as agents also enjoy a reduced
ability to make promotiondecisions accordingto theirown preferencesseparatefrom
the goals of theirprincipals.
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INTRODUCTION: THE VALUE OF COMPETITION IN INTERNAL JOB MARKETS

Since the days of Adam Smith, economists have extolled the virtues of competition.

Competition drives down prices, forces inefficient firms from the market, and leads to
the production of a diverse array of goods and services. It is unsurprising that
economists eventually looked to competition in studying the design of wage
compensation and promotion schemes. One result-tournament theory-uses the idea
that employers employ rank-order contests to provide lower level workers with
incentives.' In its simple form, tournament theory considers two workers and a single
prize, usually a large salary or a promotion. At the end of the contest, the employer
ranks the two workers based on easily observable criteria and bestows the prize on only
one of them. In competing for the prize, both workers expend effort and avoid shirking.
In other words, promotions are not solely about promoting the best person for the job.
The promotion "prize"-and the competition it creates-is intended to induce
employees to work harder in their current positions. 2
Legal scholars have applied tournament theory to a wide range of topics. The theory
dominates the scholarship about the internal workings of law firms. 3 The theory also

1. See Jerry R. Green & Nancy L. Stokey, A Comparison of Tournaments andContracts,
91 J. POL. EcoN. 349 (1983); Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-OrderTournamentsas

Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); James M. Malcolmson, Work
Incentives, Hierarchy, and Internal Labor Markets, 92 J. POL. ECON. 486 (1984); Barry J.
Nalebuff & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of
Compensation and Competition, 14 BELL J. ECON. 21 (1983).

2. In addition, by comparing two workers, the employer can determine whether a positive
outcome (e.g., high sales) is the result of a worker's additional effort or good fortune. For
example, if both workers have high sales, an employer might infer that the market was hot;
hence, the high sales did not result from extra effort by either worker. In contrast, if only one
worker has high sales, a logical inference is that worker exerted extra effort. In other words,

comparison of the two workers enables the employer to uncover the true source of high sales. As
a result, the employer can more effectively tie salary increases to effort levels. See Margaret A.
Meyer & John Vickers, PerformanceComparisonsandDynamic Incentives, 105 J. POL. ECON.

547, 548 (1997); Nalebuff & Stiglitz, supra note 1, at 22. The upshot is that relative rankings

are useful when common external shocks-such as a hot market-influence each worker's
performance on the measured criteria. Hence, where external shocks are possible-such as law
firm billable hours-our discussion centers on "tournaments" (that is, relative rankings) rather
than objective screens or hurdles. In contexts where external shocks to productivity are unlikely
(for example, academic tenure in law schools), we focus on minimum quantity standards, rather
than relative performance. The information-forcing results hold even if decision makers use

objective screens instead of tournaments.
3. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Tournament at the
Intersection of Business and Legal Ethics, 1 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 909 (2004); Leonard M.
Baynes, FallingThrough the Cracks: Race and CorporateLaw Firms, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV.

785 (2003); Charlotte Chiu & Kevin T. Leicht, When Does FeminizationIncreaseEquality: The
Case of Lawyers, 33 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 557 (1999); Marc S. Galanter & Thomas M. Palay,
Large Law Firm Misery: It's the Tournament, Not the Money, 52 VAND. L. REv. 953 (1999);
Bruce M. Price, How Green Was My Valley? An Examination of Tournament Theory as a
Governance Mechanism in Silicon Valley Firms, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 731 (2003); Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Law Firms, Competition Penalties,and the Values of Professionalism,13 GEO. J.
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figures into discussions about other internal labor markets, including inquiries into why
and when corporate actors misbehave, why U.S. executives are paid the amounts that
they are, and how judges should be promoted.4 Often (although not always), subjective,
less measurable criteria are just as indicative of future success as the objective and
measurable criteria use in promotions, including billable hours in the context of law
firms and profits earned in the corporate context. Although billable hours are
important, an associate's judgment and ethical behavior are arguably at least as
important predictors of success as a law firm partner. 5 The ideal promotion decision
may depend on both an assessment of objective and subjective criteria.
LEGAL ETHIcs 1 (1999); Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1719 (1998); George Rutherglen & Kevin A. Kordana, A
Farewellto Tournaments?The Needfor an Alternative ExplanationofLaw Firm Structure and
Growth, 84 VA. L. REV. 1695 (1998); Susan S. Samuelson & Lynn J. Jaffe, A Statistical
Analysis of Law Firm Profitability,70 B.U. L. REV. 185 (1990); Randall S. Thomas et al.,
Megafirms, 80 N.C. L. REV. 115 (2001); David B. Wilkins, Doing Well By Doing Good? The
Role of Public Service in the Careersof Black CorporateLawyers, 41 Hous. L. REV. 1 (2004);
David B. Wilkins, From "Separate is Inherently Unequal" to "Diversity is Good For
Business": The Rise of Market-BasedDiversityArguments and the Fateof the CorporateBlack
Bar, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1548 (2004); David B. Wilkins & G. Mitu Gulati, Reconceiving the
Tournament of Lawyers: Tracking, Seeding, and Information Control in the InternalLabor
Markets of Elite Law Firms, 84 VA. L. REV. 1581 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Iman Anabtawi, Explaining Pay Without Performance: The Tournament
Alternative, 54 EMORY L. J. (forthcoming 2005); William W. Bratton, Enron andtheDarkSide
of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275 (2002); Stephen Choi & Mitu Gulati, A
Tournament of Judges?, 92 CAL. L. REV. 299 (2004); Jill E. Fisch, Lawyers on the Auction
Block: Evaluating the Selection of Class Counsel by Auction, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 650, 662
(2002); Eric Kades, Windfalls, 108 YALE L.J. 1489, 1552-53 (1999); Kimberly D. Krawiec,
Accounting for Greed: Unraveling the Rogue Trader Mystery, 79 OR. L. REV. 301, 311-13
(2000); Donald C. Langevoort, The HumanNature of CorporateBoards: Law, Norms, andthe
UnintendedConsequencesof Independenceand Accountability, 89 GEO. L.J. 797, 808 (2001);
Martin J. McMahon, Jr. & Alice G. Abreu, Winner-Take-All Markets: Easing the Casefor
ProgressiveTaxation,4 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (1998); Marleen A. O'Connor, The EnronBoard:The
PerilsofGroupthink, 71 U. CIN. L. REv. 1233, 1252-55 (2003); Susan J. Stabile, My Executive
Makes More Than Your Executive: RationalizingExecutive Pay in a Global Economy, 14 N.Y.
INT'L L. REV. 63, 67 (2001).
5. For purposes of this essay, we assume that (1) the objectively measurable criteria at
issue are less important than the subjective criteria, and (2) the subjective criteria cannot be
measured. Strictly speaking, this is incorrect. Even the apparently fuzzy factors such as
collegiality and fairness can be "objectified" and measured through personality tests. And,
assuming that these measurements are taken with good instruments, there is empirical
scholarship that demonstrates the superiority of these "objectified" measures over subjective,
impressionistic, and "gut-feeling"judgments about the same attribute. Implicit in those studies,
however, is the assumption that most, if not all, of the criteria that need to be factored into the
prediction models can be measured by both objective and subjective methods. If so, then the
regressions and other more scientific models seem to do a better job in making predictions of
future behavior than do personal subjective estimations of the trait at issue (for example,
judgment). However, we are examining somewhat different contexts. We are assuming that it is
not possible (or, more precisely, not acceptable) to subject the participants in these settings to
such measures as personality tests of the type that would then yield objective scores. For
discussions of the research cited above, see William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative
Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, Impressionistic)and Formal (Mechanical,Algorithmic)
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In the areas of interest to legal scholars, standard tournament theory is incomplete.
Key promotion criteria seem unrelated to criteria that most observers would agree are
important for higher-level jobs. As noted, law firm associates obsess about and
compete over billable hours. Yet, without exception, partners we spoke to (informally)
asserted that, in predicting an associate's success as a partner, the ability to bill a large
number of hours is less important than the ability to exercise judgment.
So, why the focus on billable hours? Competition over objective criteria can
sometimes lead to the revelation of information useful in the promotion process. By
inducing a heightened level of competition among promotion candidates, a tournament
can force the candidates to reveal otherwise difficult-to-observe information, including
more subjective attributes such as judgment, fairness, collegiality, and integrity.6 We
assume that participants in the tournament are unable to convey credibly this difficultto-observe information (if known to the participants) to the decision makers. Few
would voluntarily reveal that they lack collegiality or integrity. Moreover, because it is
difficult to place an objective metric on these subjective attributes, running a
tournament based directly on them would not be feasible. After all, how would an
organization structure a tournament based directly on which person has the most
integrity? Participants may reveal some types of information, such as integrity, only
when under the stress of competition over some other goal.
Take, as an example, a tennis match. One player wins, but that is not the only piece
of information that the players learn about each other as a result ofthe game. The game
allows each player to observe how the other exercises judgment as to other matters
such as close line calls. If one player consistently makes all the close calls in his favor,
that provides an observer with information with which to make an inference about the
personality of that player. The inference drawn might be that this person is highly
competitive and unethical. If that same player also frequently challenges his opponent's
calls and periodically throws tantrums, these actions will provide information with
which to make additional inferences. This new information might help confirm a prior
inference about the player's competitiveness and allow for the additional inference that
PredictionProcedures:The Clinical-StatisticalControversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 293

(1996) (reporting on the dominance of formal prediction procedures over informal ones); John
Monahan, The Scientific Status of Research on Clinical andActuarialPredictionsof Violence,
in MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TEsTIMONY 423 (David L.

Faigman et al. eds., 2d ed. 2002) (similar); Russell Smyth, Do Judges Behave as Homo
Economicus and, ifso, Can We Measure Their Performance?An Antipodean Perspectiveon a
Tournament of Judges, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005) (pointing to the large
literature that suggests that criteria such as collegiality and integrity can be measured using
relatively objective methods).
6. This framework resembles the dynamic principal-agent models seen in the economic
literature. See, e.g., Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,

56 ECONOMETRICA 1153 (1988); Meyer & Vickers, supra note 2. From the labor economists,
Bentley MacLeod and James Malcomson's work comes closest to the discussion here. See W.
Bentley MacLeod & James M. Malcomson, Reputation and Hierarchyin Dynamic Models of

Employment, 96 J. POL. EcoN. 832 (1988). In their model, the employer uses a tournament to
promote workers through a job pyramid. Through the competition over increasingly limited slots
in the pyramid, the employer learns about the private attributes of each worker. Our paper
extends and builds on MacLeod and Malcomson's model by considering (1) the precise link
between objective and subjective standards, and (2) why tournaments are used sometimes and
not others.
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this person is emotionally childish. The nature of these inferences will change as a
function of context: how close the match was, what the stakes were, and the history of
the two players' relationship. The point is that the competitive process provides
information not only about who the winner is, but also about the kinds of strategic
choices or judgment calls made by each player in the course of competing.
Therefore, an employer seeking to choose among a set of potential employees-for
example, summer associates at a law firn-may find it useful to set up a tennis
tournament at the firm's annual retreat to observe how these prospective employees
behave. The employer cares little about who wins, but obtains information by setting
up the competition and observing the choices competitors make.
The information-forcing nature of the competitive process provides insights into the
way employers structure internal labor markets. The need to force information from
workers may explain why employers set up what appear to be two-round promotion
tournaments. These promotion systems differ from the promotion systems predicted by
standard tournament theory. In the first round, easily observable criteria are employed
to rank candidates relative to one another, allowing decision makers to cull the number
of candidates down to a smaller subset to be considered for promotion. The smaller
subset of candidates is then pushed into a "second round," where the organization
evaluates hard-to-observe subjective characteristics such as judgment and collegiality. s
The information-forcing function of this two-round "revelation" tournament sheds
light on a puzzling aspect of the use of tournament theory to explain internal labor
markets. Contrary to conventional tournament theory, organizations disclose explicit

7. This example is not all that far-fetched. In the late 1990s, a firm told one of the authors
(Baker) that the only way to not get a permanent offer after being a summer associate was to
rush the mound during the annual firm softball game. Rumor has it that one federal circuit court
judge used to go around to top law schools holding informal poker tournaments for law review
members. Those who did well at the tournaments had the best shot at getting a clerkship with
the judge. Presumably, this judge found that students behaved in ways during the poker
tournament that revealed information that he could not easily obtain by looking at their resumes,
speaking to their references, or interviewing them in his office. Cf David Margolick, At the Bar:
Annual Racefor Clerks Becomes a Mad Dash, with JudicialDecorum Left in the Dust, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 17, 1989, at B4 (discussing the clerkship hiring process, including the poker
interviews used by one judge).
8. Note that the subjective criteria need not positively correlate with the objective criteria
for information forcing to work. Therefore, the winner of the first round is not necessarily the
winner of the second round. Someone may produce a high-value outcome (for example, a large
number of billable hours), and most of the time, this outcome will be a good thing (for example,
because it generates a lot of income for the firm). But the associate's desire to bill more hours,
including hours where she was so tired that she made mistakes, may reveal bad judgment. And
ensuring that its partners have good judgment may be more important to the firm than selecting
the associate who is willing to bill 4000 hours per year. An associate who wins the first round
by billing the highest number of hours may manage to lose the second round by demonstrating
bad judgment in billing hours at times when it was not physically possible for her to have been
working at peak capacity. And to the extent some of her projects fell through because of
demonstrably bad judgment on account of the high number of hours billed, the firm will
conclude that, although she wins the first round, she ultimately loses because she loses the
second round.
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promotion criteria. 9 For example, in making partnership decisions, law firms employ
what is conceptually a revelation tournament that entails some combination of
objectively measurable criteria (such as billed hours and successful deals completed)
and subjective criteria (such as judgment, leadership, and collegiality).'° This fuzzy
standard enables the law firm to make decisions based on attributes of the candidate
that can only be measured subjectively. The first-round competition involving less
important objective measures forces information about subjective traits and so
facilitates the second-round evaluation.
In settings where the use of objective evidence to make decisions about relative
merit is challenged, critics typically deploy two primary arguments: (a) the data does
not capture important aspects of the candidate's performance or suitability for the job
at issue, and (b) the focus on objective but imperfect measures of performance
encourages wasteful strategic behavior in employees because they focus excessively on
the measurable (and rewarded) criteria and ignore the other important but less
measurable criteria." We have no quarrel with these arguments.

9. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 3, at 1620-24 (describing the selection criteria for
promotion at law firms). Although there appears to be very little systematic research on the
nature of law school promotion processes, most of the commentary that mentions the process
suggests that the criteria for promotion are unclear (other than a general notion that one must
produce some combination of scholarship, teaching, and service, where scholarship is more
important than the other two). See Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Tenure, 53 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 157 (2003) (describing the vague nature of the process behind most law school
promotion decisions); Henry Gabriel, Juggling ScholarshipandSocial Commitment: Service to
the Community Through Representation of Indigent CriminalDefendants, 20 N.C. CENT. L.J.
223, 225 n.5 (noting that the tradeoffs between doing scholarship and pro bono work are
generally not made clear to junior faculty); Kenneth Lasson, ScholarshipAmok: Excesses in the
Pursuitof Truth and Tenure, 103 HARV.L. REv. 926, 935-37 (1990) (describing the vague and
subjective nature of the scholarship requirements for legal academics); Melissa Marlow-Shafer,
Student Evaluation of TeacherPerformance and the "Legal Writing-Pathology:" Diagnosis
Confirmed,5 N.Y. CITY L. REv. 115, 127 (2002) (noting that 18% of legal writing instructors
did not know whether student evaluations affected decisions regarding promotion, tenure, or
merit pay increases).
10. See Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 3, at 1658-65 (describing the partnership promotion
process in law firms). Wilkins and Gulati describe the partnership promotion process as a
"multiround tournament model that includes multiple incentive systems, tracking, seeding, and
information control." Id.at 1589. Wilkins and Gulati do not mention the information-generating
aspects of a tournament. Instead, they posit that the multi-round nature of the law firm
tournament provides incentives for different types of associates (including those with no
intention of making partner) to work hard. See id at 1644-51.
Through tracking [across multiple tournament rounds], firms strengthen the
commitments of associates whom they want to stay while simultaneously giving
those not receiving training reason to seek rewards other than winning the
tournament. Associates who continue to get good work are more likely to be happy
and to stay at the firm. Not only are they satisfying their desire to develop human
capital, but they are also receiving a tangible signal from the firm that their
chances of winning the tournament are better than the many associates who are
only receiving paperwork.
Id.
11. See, e.g., infra note 44 and accompanying text (citing the Goldberg, Orth, and Marshall
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To borrow from the title of Steven Kerr's classic article, it is often indeed "folly [to]
reward[] A, while hoping for B."' 2 Economists have concluded that the distortional
effects described above can explain why many multi-task jobs are characterized by
"low-powered" incentive schemes.13 A low-powered incentive scheme does not reward
the worker based on performance; instead, the employer pays a fixed wage. In contrast,
a high-powered incentive scheme bases compensation largely on performance on some
measured basis. Piece-rate pay is the most commonly used example. Where a job
involves multiple tasks and performance is measurable on some tasks but not others, a
high-powered incentive scheme causes the worker to concentrate on the measured task.
In so doing, the worker might ignore or shirk the nonmeasurable tasks, which may be
equally important to the employer. This distortion renders the high-powered incentive
scheme potentially undesirable.
Our insight is that high-powered incentive schemes work nonetheless in multi-task
environments. The resulting contract, however, is more complicated than commonly
modeled. As noted, in a revelation tournament, employers combine performance-based
pay with a vague and fuzzy promotion standard. On the measurable output level, the
employer rewards the worker: the more hours billed, the greater the associate's salary
and his or her chance at a year-end bonus. But, as in the economic models, the
performance-based pay induces the worker to obsess about the performance measure
and, perhaps, ignore the job's more subjective tasks (e.g., helping others). The
employer can then use the worker's performance on the subjective tasks to make the
promotion decision. While a mere statement on the part of the worker that she likes to
"help others" is not credible, actual observation of the worker assisting her co-workers,
even when under the stress of a tournament, provides the employer with credible
information on the predilection of the worker on this subjective characteristic. 14 In
other words, providing high-powered incentives for task A may enable the employer to
identify those employees who will be most likely to excel at task B. The relative
unimportance of the first-round objective criteria may not matter so long as the
competition over these criteria reveals hard-to-observe information about the
promotion candidates.
Our revelation tournament theory can, as a positive matter, add to the existing
explanations for the existence of multi-round tournaments in certain situations, such as
critiques of using empirical rankings in the promotion ofjudges). The standard cite on this point
is a 1975 article by Steven Kerr that was later republished as a classic in 1995. See Steven Kerr,
An Academy Classic: On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hopingfor B, 9 AcAD. MGMT.
EXECUTIVE 7 (1995) (observing how reward systems are often structured to discourage desired
behavior and encourage unproductive actions).
12. Kerr, supra note 11.
13. Kerr's insight about the distortional effects of "high-powered" incentive systems has
been formalized and built on by economists, some of whom seek to explain why jobs that
require multi-tasking often use "low-powered" incentives. See George P. Baker, Incentive
Contractsand PerformanceMeasurement, 100 J. POL. EcoN. 598 (1992); Bengt Holmstrom &

Paul Milgrom, MultitaskPrincipal-AgentAnalyses: Incentive Contracts,Asset Ownership, and
Job Design, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24 (1991). In the accounting literature, see Gerald Feltham &

Jim Xie, Performance Measure Congruity and Diversity in Multi-Task Principal/Agent
Relations, 69 ACcT. REv. 429 (1994).
14. For example, in the drive for billable hours, an associate may yell at support people or
neglect co-workers. Law firm partners could see or hear about these activities and then make
promotion decisions based on the now-uncovered characteristics.
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partnership promotions within law firms. We also make a normative argument that
revelation tournaments may prove useful in flushing out the hidden motivations of
decision makers in other promotion situations, such as judicial nominations. Agency
problems may lead decision makers acting as agents (e.g., politicians in the case of
judicial nominations) to eschew such tournaments even if increased transparency
would benefit the principals (e.g., the voting public). Put differently, the question that
the positive portion of our analysis raises is this: if promotion tournaments involving
measurable criteria can be effectively used in the private sector to force information
about candidates' traits, why do we not see greater use of revelation tournaments in
less profit-oriented settings such as the legal academia or the federal judiciary?
In answering this question, we note that a revelation tournament restricts the
discretion of agents in decision-making positions. With the tournament in place,
decision makers must justify a promotion decision based on the information revealed
through the tournament. Decision makers, however, value discretion in making
promotion choices. One reason for this is that the more discretion decision makers
have, the greater the incentives of the lower-level employees to engage in influence
activities-that is, paying rents to and garnering favor with the agents in control-and
this potentially benefits the controlling agents to a greater extent than a system in
which the promotion criteria are more transparent.15 Alternatively, decision makers
acting as agents may eschew a revelation tournament to allow the decision makers to
make decisions more in line with their own personal preferences, even if in conflict
with the goals of the principals. The lack of information allows the decision makers to
mask their true motives from the principals in selecting a particular candidate for
promotion. The failure to use a revelation tournament, therefore, reflects a kind of
agency cost. By rejecting the tournament, decision makers maintain discretion and the
resulting rents that come with that discretion.
We are not suggesting that a revelation tournament is appropriate in all employment
situations. In some cases, easily observable objective criteria may be the best
predictors of future success, even for candidates who are seeking promotion to a new
position. And even where harder-to-observe subjective criteria provide more
information on the probability of success, running a tournament based on objective
criteria may provide little information about the subjective criteria. Last, the cost of
implementing a revelation tournament may simply outweigh the benefits.
In this Article, we develop a revelation tournament model that we hope will improve
current understanding of many promotion systems. The Article consists of two parts.

15. Paul Milgrom's insight was that in contexts where changing jobs is costly and the
higher-level employees have control and discretion over promotions, lower-level employees
have an incentive to engage in wasteful "influence activities." One solution is to put in place
promotion criteria that limit the discretion of those agents making promotion decisions. As
discretion over promotion decisions is limited, the incentives to engage inthe wasteful influence
activities are correspondingly reduced. See Paul R. Milgrom, Employment Contracts, Influence
Activities, and Efficient Organization Design, 96 J. POL. EcoN. 42 (1988). In his paper,

Milgrom initially defines efforts at influence activities as redistributive. That is, because of
influence activities, the decision maker takes ajob perk from workerA and gives it to worker B.
Under these conditions, it is sometimes optimal for the organization to restrict decision maker
discretion and eliminate any gains from competing for influence. Milgrom also shows that a
similar result holds when the redistribution assumption is relaxed.
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Part I describes the operation of the revelation tournament, and we use law firm
partnership decisions to illustrate the general point. Part II extends our analysis to
academic tenure decisions, judicial promotions, and law school rankings.
I. REVELATION TOURNAMENTS

In this section, we first provide an intuitive description ofthe benefits of a two-stage
revelation tournament. We then describe how law firm partnership promotions display
characteristics of a revelation tournament. Not every promotion decision, however, is
suited for a revelation tournament. The section concludes by discussing situations in
which revelation tournaments offer the greatest benefits.
A. The Revelation Tournament
A few definitions and assumptions will clarify the rest of the discussion. We refer to
those competing against one another for promotion as "candidates." We assume that
the candidates desire promotion to a higher position. Those making the decision to
promote a particular candidate are referred to as "decision makers."
The term "objective" refers to promotion criteria that are observable, rankable, and
quantifiable. Given the objective criteria and two candidates, A and B, a person can
conclude that "A beats B" or vice versa, according to those criteria. The interpretation
of the data does not hinge on the subjective impressions of the person ranking the
candidates.
The term "subjective" criteria, in contrast, includes things like judgment, fairness,
temperament, creativity, and the ability to work with others. These criteria are fuzzy
and initially unknown to those decision makers making promotion decisions. We also
assume that candidates have propensities that are preexisting and fixed, such as the
propensity towards collegiality or team work. Put differently, candidates are not able to
become good team players or highly ethical as soon as they discover that the employer
is looking for those characteristics. Candidates can and will lie about their propensities
when the stakes are minimal (i.e., talk is cheap). But, in the context of competition with
meaningful stakes, they will be less able to compete effectively without revealing their
true propensities. We also assume that a tournament cannot be constructed directly on
the basis of subjective criteria either because there exists no objective metric with
which to rank people or because parties will reveal their subjective attributes only
when under the stress of competition over other unrelated objective criteria.
Finally, we assume that subjective criteria are an important predictor of success at a
higher level position. Objective criteria may very well be equally or even more
important. We only assume that the subjective criteria provide valuable additional
information for the promotion decision (sufficient, at least in some cases, to warrant the
cost of a two-stage revelation tournament). As an example, consider that judgment,
loyalty, and collegiality may be equally as predictive of a candidate's success as a law
firm partner (from the firm's perspective, that is) compared with billed hours,
transactions completed, or cases won. The process of completing a high-pressure
transaction may produce information about how an associate deals with her teammates
in such situations, revealing information about collegiality among other attributes.
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Subjective evaluations are not always better predictors than objective ones. The
empirical literature suggests that objective prediction procedures often outperform
subjective ones.' 6 We make no claim that a revelation tournament is appropriate for all
promotion decisions. The claim is only that such a tournament may generate valuable
information under certain conditions. If the most important criteria for promotion are
not amenable to objective measurement, then a tournament based on readily observable
objective criteria may still be worthwhile if the tournament generates information on
the less readily observable and more important subjective criteria. Where the two types
of criteria are not related, as discussed below, a revelation tournament offers little of
value. 17
We can formalize the two-stage structure of a revelation tournament as follows:
* Stage 1: Candidates compete with one another based on objective,
easily observable criteria. Judged on their relative performance based
on the objective criteria, only a fraction of the total number of
candidates will make it to Stage 2.
* Stage 2: Decision makers use otherwise hard-to-observe subjective
information generated from Stage 1 to make a promotion decision
from among the "winners" of Stage 1.
Based on the amount of information available on the subjective attributes of a
particular candidate, people may disagree over the rankings of two candidates. For
now, assume that decision makers share the same uniform criteria for selection. This
assumption means that if every decision maker were fully informed--that is, they knew
everything about the attributes of every candidate-they would agree on the best
candidate for promotion.' 8 As more information about the subjective attributes
becomes available, we get closer to this ideal and, accordingly, the chance of
disagreement among the decision makers falls.
B. Law Firm PartnershipDecisions
Law firm partnership decisions provide a ready application of the revelation
tournament. Most elite law firms in the United States have some version of an "up or
out" promotion system.' 9 They hire large numbers of junior associates, put them

16. See supra note 5 (citing materials). Indeed, objective statistical criteria, as opposed to
the subjective evaluation of legal experts, have been shown to be a better predictor of case
outcomes in the Supreme Court. See Theodore W. Ruger, Pauline T. Kim, Andrew D. Martin &
Kevin M. Quinn, The Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science
Approaches to PredictingSupreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLuM. L. REv. 1150 (2004)

(showing that a statistical model based on case characteristics was superior to the judgments of
eighty-three legal experts in forecasting the results of cases in the Supreme Court's 2002 Term).
17. See infra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (discussing the needed link between the
objective and subjective criteria).
18. We relax this assumption. See infra Part I.D.
19. See Larry E. Ribstein, Law PartnerExpulsion, 55 Bus. LAw. 845, 848 (2000) (noting
that "firms traditionally have engaged in promotion 'tournaments' in which associates either
advance to partnership or leave the firm after a probationary period"). Firms have moved away
from the up-or-out system into a two-tiered partnership structure, consisting of equity and nonequity partners. This move has not decreased the stress placed on associates or the tournament
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through a grueling apprenticeship period of six to ten years, and then promote the small
fraction that performs best. At first blush, law firms appear to present the perfect
example of a standard tournament. 20 Although intuitively and superficially appealing,
standard tournament theory, fails to capture the realities and nuances of most law firm
promotion decisions. 2' If, for example, firms really wanted to maximize the number of
billable hours among associates, firms could base promotion standards on one fixed
and verifiable criterion: the number of hours billed while an associate. Such a criterion
would generate more billable hours than the current promotion system used by most
law firms. Similarly, if firms wanted to maximize the volume of business generated by
associates, promotions could be based on a tournament explicitly designed to reward
associates who generated more business. The reality of law firm promotion systems,
however, is that almost none of them use simple systems based on billable hours or the
dollar values of deals generated. Instead, it is unclear precisely what the associate
needs to do to "win" the tournament. Firms leave undefined both the specific
promotion criteria for partnership and the relative weights attached to each criterion.22
Out of this black box, a vote of the partnership determines the ultimate promotion
decision.
As noted, the foregoing does not mean that easily measurable criteria such as
billable hours are unimportant. To the contrary, they are important. But subjective
factors are also important. The revelation tournament model seeks to explain the
interaction between objective and subjective factors.
Law firms' promotion systems can be modeled as a two-round revelation
tournament. Easily observable criteria, like billable hours, are evaluated first and used
to reduce the number of associates eligible for partnership consideration. The law firms
then engage in a second round of evaluation, whereby partners look at traits like
judgment, creativity, loyalty, and collegiality. Reducing the pool of candidates from
which decision makers must choose partners makes the direct effort of evaluating
subjective criteria less costly. Our point is that there is a further benefit: the first stage
tournament results in information generated on these very same subjective criteria.

feel of associate life in a big firm. See John Conley &Scott Baker, Fallfrom Grace orBusiness
as Usual? A Retrospective Look at Lawyers on Wall Street and Main Street, 30 LAW & Soc.

(forthcoming 2005) (looking at how law firm economics and culture has changed over
time). Ronald Gilson and Robert Mnookin developed the most sophisticated economic model of
the "up or out" partnership process. See Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, ComingofAge
in a CorporateLaw Firm: The Economics ofAssociate CareerPatterns, 41 STAN. L. REv. 567
(1989). Like us, Gilson and Mnookin attribute the "trial" associate period to an effort by law
firms to screen associates for various subjective characteristics. This paper builds on their work
by showing how the billable hour requirement plays a critical role in this screening process. In
addition, our framework provides ajustification for the murky promotion process used by most
law firms.
20. See GALANTER & PALAY, supra note 3 (making this point most prominently).
21. For critiques of tournament theory as applied to law firm promotion structures, see
Price, supra note 3; Rutherglen & Kordana, supra note 3; Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 3. Cf
Richard H. Sander & E. Douglass Williams, A Little Theorizing About the Big Law Firm:
Galanter,Palay, and the Economics of Growth, 17 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 391 (1992) (critiquing
the growth-rate predictions that Galanter and Palay draw from the tournament model).
22. See Price, supra note 3; Wilkins & Gulati, supra note 3.
INQUIRY
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If one were to ask most law firm partners what characteristic defines a good lawyer,
they would likely say "judgment., 23 If pressed further, some might explain that this
judgment is primarily associated with an intuitive understanding of how to negotiate
ambiguities in the law. Others would say that they look for the creative spark that
suggests a future ability to come up with innovative solutions. Last but not least, there
will be a few partners who attach value to the ability to schmooze and bring in clients.
But as partners extol and promote based on these subjective qualities, associates focus
obsessively on objective measures such as billable hours, measures that seem distant
from the criteria listed above.
Why this disconnect? Certainly, partners care about billable hours and the number
of deals closed. These activities provide revenue for the firm.24 Associates know this
and act accordingly. Yet, these same activities generate information, and law firms
would be hard pressed to make a partnership decision without a long track record to
use in assessing an associate's more intangible qualities. An associate who significantly
outperforms her colleagues on the billable-hours criterion-for example, by billing
3000 hours a year when everyone else is billing around 2500 hours-will likely make it
to the second round of the promotion tournament. She is eligible for partnership, but
not assured of it. Because of the billable-hours competition and the obsession it
induces in associates, however, that same high-billing associate will, perhaps
inadvertently, demonstrate an affinity or a lack of affinity for the other qualities that
matter most to the firm. Put bluntly, if the associate handles enough cases, the odds are
that there will be instances of either dramatic success or abject failure; these extremes
can then be plumbed for evidence ofjudgment. Further, in the drive to outperform her
competitors in the billing competition, the associate may reveal herself as a consistent
"over-biller" (i.e., one willing to cut ethical comers).

23. Cf Leonard M. Baynes, Falling Through the Cracks: Race and the CorporateLaw
Firm, 77 ST.JoHN's L. REv. 785, 794 (2003) (noting that "the traditional [law firm] hiring
criteria often ignore the most important factor of being a good lawyer: judgment"); Therese
Maynard, Teaching Professionalism:The Lawyer as a Professional,34 GA. L. REv. 895, 928
(2000) ("'Good lawyers must have the skills required for professional competence. But this is
not enough. They must know how to carry the burdens of other people on their shoulders. They
must know of pain, and how to help heal it."') (quoting James D. Gordon III, Law Review and
the Modern Mind, 33 ARIz. L. REv. 265, 271 (1991)); Joseph W. Rand, Understanding Why
Good Lawyers Go Bad: Using Case Studies in Teaching Cognitive Bias in Legal DecisionMaking, 9 CLINICAL L. REv. 731, 734 (2003) ("'The good lawyer brings more to bear on a
problem than legal knowledge and lawyering skills. She brings creativity, common sense,
practical wisdom, and that most precious of all commodities, good judgment."') (quoting Paul
Brest & Linda Krieger, On Teaching ProfessionalJudgment, 69 WAsH. L. REv. 527, 529
(1994)).
24. See William J. Wemz, The Ethics of LargeLaw Firms-ResponsesandReflections, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics 175, 178 (2002) (noting that "broad disparities in profits [among law
firms] appear to be principally determined by numbers of billable hours and by leverage, the
ratio of associates to partners"); M. Cathleen Kaveny, Billable Hours in Ordinary Time: A
Theological Critiqueor the Instrumentalizationof Time in ProfessionalLife, 33 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 173, 175 (2001) ("One way large law firms make money is by charging out their associates'
time for more than they are paying the associates in salary; the difference (less overhead) is
distributed to partners as profits. The longer associates work, the more money partners make.").
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C. Information Types andRevelation

Revelation tournaments work best when the ultimate promotion decision depends on
subjective, hard-to-observe and hard-to-verify characteristics, such as ethics, creativity,
collegiality, and so on. We can further divide the subjective information generated
through a revelation tournament along two additional dimensions. First, the rate at
which subjective information is generated as a by-product of objective competition
may vary. Second, the relationship between the subjective information and the intensity
with which candidates compete over the objective criteria (with resulting stress
imposed on the candidates) may vary according to context. We discuss below each
dimension and its implications for the desirability of a revelation tournament.25
1. Quantity Requirements and Diminishing Returns
Collecting information about a promotion candidate that is based on objective
criteria may help shed light on harder-to-measure subjective criteria but, past a certain
point, such gains in understanding may be limited. Suppose that a law firm can acquire
subjective information by observing an associate's first year of work alone. In this
case, assuming the candidates for promotion have generated some minimum, yet fully
informative, amount of work product, a tournament based on objective criteria may not
add to the subjective information already generated.
Promotion situations are good candidates for an information revelation tournament
when the accuracy of decision makers' observations based on the subjective criteria
increases significantly with the amount of effort put in by candidates in generating
objective work product. Given the noise inherent in determining whether an associate
possesses good judgment, good character, and genuine loyalty, law firm promotionsand many other job promotions where decisionmaking ability is an important criteriaappear to meet this requirement. While good performance in an associate's first year of
work may indicate strong subjective characteristics, confidence in this assessment is
possible only when decision makers can consider a larger body of work product.

25. Participants in a revelation tournament may already possess information about
themselves of the sort that decision makers will determine subjectively by means of the
tournament. Where participants possess this information beforehand, the revelation tournament
provides a means for decision makers to discem the information. On the other hand, participants
may not possess this information about themselves beforehand. In this case, the revelation
tournament functions more to generate information.
In either case, the following question arises: is a revelation tournament the most costefficient method of gaining information? Generating new information is costly. Other, more
direct means of generating the information than a revelation tournament may exist. Nonetheless,
even where candidates do not have full information about themselves, they may actively desire
to portray themselves in a certain light (even if that depiction is a false one). A candidate may
not know ahead of time whether he would act ethically when faced with a large monetary
temptation; however, regardless of how he would in fact behave, he would have an incentive, if

asked, to declare himself ethical. A revelation tournament provides a method to distinguish
among these participants. Particularly where the desired information is subjective, and thus hard
to measure objectively or to verify ex ante, a revelation tournament provides a credible method
of generating information.
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2. High-Stress Information
A tournament (more colorfully, a "rat race") often puts candidates in situations of
high stress. 26 Faced with a time crunch, associates face decisions about whether to cut
comers in their work and how to juggle various client priorities. Such decisions involve
"judgment" on the part of associates and, as a result, provide more information on the
subjective characteristics of associates than may be provided by more mundane, lowstress work. For example, an associate who routinely over-bills a client to pad her
hours billed might not exhibit this trait in a work situation that did not pressure her to
compete on billable hours.
Tournaments reward participants on the basis of their performances relative to each
other. Even if everyone does well, only a small fraction will be promoted. This rat race
can have effects we ordinarily think of as negative. Some participants who perform
poorly on objective criteria may in fact display high subjective attributes. Nonetheless,
these participants will get culled in the first-stage tournament over objective criteria in
a revelation tournament. For candidates who are worried about winning and do not see
themselves as necessarily ahead of the others, the tournament system can encourage
them to take higher-than-normal risks and even sabotage each other.27 If the promotion
percentage is small enough (for example, only one in fifty associates gets promoted to
partnership) these perverse incentives will be widespread. For institutions such as law
firms that value teamwork and want their associates to reduce, rather than exacerbate,
risk it seems strange to have a promotion
scheme that encourages precisely the type of
28
behavior that the firm does not want.
When do the benefits from a revelation tournament likely outweigh the costs? An
organization will be more apt to bear these costs when the promotion in question

26. The rat race reference comes from papers by Renee Landers and George Akerlof. Their
general idea is similar to ours in that these authors see the effect of rat races (a term that is used
to connote what otherwise appear to be inefficiently high expenditures of effort) as producing
otherwise hard-to-observe information. See George Akerlof, The Economics of Caste andof the
Rat Race and Other Woeful Tales, 90 Q.J. ECON. 599 (1976) (demonstrating how workers may
work long hours in order to signal unobservable productivity); Renee M. Landers, James B.
Rebitzer & Lowell J. Taylor, Rat Race Redux: Adverse Selection in the Determinationof Work
Hours in Law Firms, 86 AM. ECON. REv. 329 (1996) (documenting empirical evidence that law
firms do use hours billed as a method to select among workers, where the underlying dynamic
appears to be an adverse selection type, one similar to that suggested by Akerlof). For other
articles using the rat race concept to study internal labor markets, see Hajime Miyazaki, The Rat
Race and InternalLabor Markets, 8 BELL J. ECoN. 394 (1977); Stuart S. Rosenthal &William
C. Strange, Agglomeration and Hours Worked (Oct. 3, 2005) (unpublished paper),
http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/%7Ewstrange/working/20papers%2010-2005/Agglomeration
%20and%2OHours%20Worked- 10-3-05.pdf.
27. See Kong-Pin Chen, Sabotage in Promotion Tournaments, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 119,
120 (2003).
28. One of us has written, nonetheless, that law firms may reduce the negative impact that
fierce tournament competition may otherwise have on collegiality through a multi-round
tournament. In such a tournament, only a progressively smaller group of winners would
continue in active competition. The losers, on the other hand, would remain with the firm (at
least for some time), motivated through high salary (among other incentives) to continue to exert
effort despite losing a tournament stage. See Wilkins & Gulati, supranote 3, at 1650-51.
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involves not simply a pay raise, but an increase in discretionary powers and a decrease
in monitoring of the worker's activities. Less monitoring means that there is a smaller
chance that a worker's mistake in judgment will be caught and corrected before it
causes a large negative consequence for the organization.
At the beginning of their legal careers, associates are monitored to some degree.
Once an associate gets promoted to partnership, monitoring drops to nearly zero and
discretionary powers correspondingly increase. It is important to the firm that
associates exercise good judgment, but it would be a disaster if a partner exercised bad
judgment. For example, take the partner who ignores a conflicts problem in order to
take on a lucrative representation of a new client. Or take the partner who forgets to fill
out the final paperwork to be admitted to the bar. In both cases, the partner's bad
judgment exposes the firm to huge risks.29 If possible, the firm would like to eliminate
candidates who make these bad judgment calls. Despite the costs of a rat race, learning
about how associates function under stress (and which associates engage in
questionable judgment calls to get past the first round) may assist law firms in selecting
partners better able to function in the best interests of the firm without any
monitoring. 30 Because of the competitive nature of the first stage of a revelation
tournament, such a tournament may be useful in revealing information about how
candidates handle themselves in a high-stress environment. Without a competitive
tournament, obtaining this particular type of information may prove costly to decision
makers.
The story thus far has been rosy; the law firm wants associates who do not cut
comers or make questionable judgment calls. The revelation tournament yields this
information. But consider the case of a firm that wants to promote associates willing to
cross ethical lines in search of profits, or one that wants to promote aggressive people
who will live and die for the firm at the expense of their personal lives. 31 The
revelation tournament generates information for these firms too. The competition over
billable hours yields useful information for all fins. It does not matter whether the
firm ultimately is looking to promote "angel" or "devil" associates.
D. Revelation Tournaments and the Decision Makers
We have assumed that all decision makers share the same motivation in making
promotion decisions. In fact, not all decision makers may have the same preferences in

29. These are both examples from the real life story of Milbank Tweed partner John
Gellene. See MILTON C. REGAN JR., EAT WHAT YOU KILL: THE FALLOFAWALL STREET LAWYER
(2004).
30. An associate with tendencies to cut ethical comers (or exercise other forms of bad
judgment) may hide these tendencies as an associate if she realizes that a second round will
occur that will block people exhibiting this sort of behavior from making partner. Nonetheless,
associates may act to hide their bad judgment even without a first-round tournament based on
objective measures of productivity. Compared with this baseline, a first-round tournament will
provide added inducement for associates to reveal their true character---doing so may at least get
the associate past the first round of the tournament (and allow the associate to remain longer at
the firm than otherwise).
31. On this point, see Landers et al., supranote 26, at 331-35 (constructing a model where
firms use billable hours to separate workers by how much they value leisure).
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selecting a candidate for promotion. But the establishment of a first-stage tournament
based on objective criteria helps to generate agreement over at least a minimum set of
criteria needed for promotion. When decision makers gather ex ante to determine a set
of objective criteria, they have the opportunity to assess what criteria they hold in
common. If they were not to attempt an objective measure, this dialog might not occur.
Moreover, since the first stage is not determinative, it presents decision makers with
less pressure to fight for criteria that perfectly match their own preferences; the result
may be desirable compromises. And because the criteria for the first-stage objective
tournament are determined before any candidates have made themselves known,
individual decision makers may negotiate over the first-stage criteria without having
already invested in a particular candidate. Again, this may facilitate compromise.
Decision makers in varying contexts may also differ in two other respects that may
affect the viability and benefit of using a revelation tournament to generate
information.
1. Agents versus Principals
Revelation tournaments may have particular benefit where decision makers act as
agents for someone else. A decision maker, as agent, might favor a candidate for
illegitimate or selfish reasons. That is, the agent's reasons for promoting candidate X
might diverge from the interests of the principals of the organization. Where interests
diverge, the agent/decision maker may not necessarily want to force out information
about his candidate. More information brings to light the positive and negative
attributes of the candidate. When information on subjective criteria remains hidden,
however, each agent/decision maker has the opportunity to "spin" the merits of the
candidate, often in a non-transparent fashion. Without quantifiable evidence, it is
difficult to argue against the agent's assessment. 32 The point is simple: the more an
agent wants to be able to spin a candidate's qualifications, the less that agent will want
an effective revelation tournament.
Even in the most profit-focused firm, the private incentives of individual agents can
differ from those of the firm. Put differently, politics will likely play a role even in the
law firm context. Individual partners may have illegitimate reasons for favoring certain
less qualified candidates over others. Specific partners, for example, may be
homophobic or racist and therefore disfavor gay and minority candidates. To the extent
that other partners recognize this proclivity, their suspicions will be heightened if
candidates favored on account of their supposed "good judgment" have low scores on
the first-stage objective criteria, such as billable hours or cases won. A partner may
attempt to make further arguments in support of a particular candidate, all based on

32. One might ask why any principal, in the absence of a paper trail, would believe an
agent/decision maker who represents that candidate Xis the best candidate. The principal, after
all, knows that the agent's preferences might diverge from his own. And, as a result, the agent
has an incentive to lie about the candidate's qualifications. Since the agent is aware of the
principal's suspicion, however, the agent's best tactic might be to mix his responses: lie about a
candidate's aptitude for the job at certain times but not at others. If the agent mixes his
responses and there is no paper trail, the principal can't be certain whether the agent is lying or
not. The revelation tournament eliminates the "mixing" option. Through the tournament, the
principal or principals learn about the true, subjective attributes of the candidate.
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subjective "good judgment." But these arguments will be harder to make when the
candidate's objectively-measured track record provides other partners with information
on the more subjective aspects of "good judgment" to the other partners.
In the context of a law firm, market forces will push the firm toward devising
mechanisms such as revelation tournaments to correct for hidden and narrowly-held
motivations that may get in the way of obtaining more profit. 33 In other contexts, where
decision makers hold diverging opinions on what constitutes the "best" candidate and
profits are only a secondary concern (if at all), the market may have little influence,
such as in the context of law professor tenure decisions and Supreme Court
nominations, as we discuss later.
2. Decision Maker Sophistication and Motivation
Where decision makers (or principals in the case of agent/decision makers) lack the
sophistication or the time and resources to appropriately assess subjective criteria,
information generated through a revelation tournament will do little good. Indeed,
establishing a tournament designed to reveal new subjective information may result in
candidates in the tournament attempting to generate new information to mislead the
decision makers. But information about matters such as the ability to exercise judgment
may be difficult, costly, or impossible to fake. Many first-year associates, for instance,
do not know whether they have good judgment. It is only the competition to bill high
numbers of hours or complete deals quickly that will force the associate to make
choices that will reveal her ability to exercise judgment. 34 And law firm partners are
well suited to detect major lapses in judgment such as the failure by an associate to
address a key argument in a brief or to include a crucial term in a contract. However, as
discussed in the next section, situations in which a revelation tournament may
otherwise have promise (such as the publication of law school rankings based on
objective measures) may fail to support such a tournament due to the lack of expertise
and sophistication on the part of consumers of such rankings.
Decision makers may also individually lack the motivation to fully assess any
additional information revealed as part of a first-stage tournament based on objective
factors. Particularly where decision makers are dispersed and fail individually to
appreciate the benefit of analyzing revealed information, a revelation tournament will
add little value.

33. Market forces may not always result in the most efficient selection systems. See, e.g.,
Tom Ginsburg & Jeffrey A. Wolf, The Marketfor Elite Law FirmAssociates, 31 FLA. ST. U. L.
REv. 909, 931-48 (2004) (contending that decentralized competition among law firms to hire
top law students pushes firms to make hiring decisions earlier than otherwise, leading to less
information on the attributes of the law students).
34. There will be other subjective characteristics that the employer cares about where the
employer has a better recognition of an employee's proclivities, such as the propensity for
honesty or collegiality. Even here, a lengthy competition can produce information-forcing if we
assume that those lacking the propensity for honesty or collegiality will find it more difficult to
display those characteristics under pressure than those who possess them.
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II. REVELATION TOURNAMENT APPLICATIONS

Revelation tournaments are not for every situation. As discussed above, the type of
subjective information that is generated in the course of a competition based on
objective criteria varies according to (1) whether the more important information for a
promotion decision is subjective and otherwise hard-to-observe, (2) the rate at which
subjective information is generated through objective competition, and (3) the
importance of "high stress" in generating the subjective information. Moreover, the
decision makers in a promotion decision may have varying preferences and
motivations. Some decision makers who are acting as agents may resist a revelation
tournament in order to give themselves room to justify actions that further their own
welfare at the expense of the ultimate principals. Imposing a revelation tournament in
such situations may help align the incentives of agents and principals.
We discuss three applications where a revelation tournament may either already
occur or potentially could occur: (1) law school tenure decisions, (2) judicial
promotion decisions, and (3) law school rankings. The examples differ. Academics
operate in a non-profit setting; promotions reflect assessments about the junior
faculty's likely contributions to knowledge and student enrichment. Federal circuit
court judges operate in a political system, with promotions to the Supreme Court
resting on political calculations. Finally, law schools operate at the crossroads of a
university setting and a market setting. They must respond to demands by students and
alumni, while at the same time pleasing the administration. This range of examples
allows us to make some preliminary judgments as to the value of using revelation
tournaments. We may also better determine how this value may vary according to both
the motivations of the decision makers and type of subjective information.
A. Law School Tenure Decisions
35
Like law firm partnership decisions, tenure is an "up-or-out" promotion system.
After a trial period, the junior faculty member is either promoted to associate professor
or fired. Many of our law school colleagues would be outraged at the suggestion of

35. There is vast literature on the economics ofthe academic tenure process. See William 0.
Brown Jr., UniversityGovernanceandAcademic Tenure: A PropertyRights Explanation, 153 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 441 (1997); H. Lome Carmichael, Incentives in
Academics: Why Is There Tenure?, 96 J. POL. ECON. 453 (1988); Fritz Machlup, In Defense of
Academic Tenure, 50 AAUP BULL. 112, 119-20 (1964), reprintedin MArrHEw W. FINKIN, THE
CASE FOR TENURE 9,22-23 (1996); Richard B. McKenzie, In Defense ofAcademic Tenure, 152
J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 325 (1996); Michael S. McPherson & Morton Owen
Schapiro, Tenure Issues in HigherEducation, J. ECON. PERSP., Winter 1999, at 85; Michael S.
McPherson & Gordon C. Winston, The Economics of Academic Tenure: A Relational
Perspective, 4 J.ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 163 (1983); Gordon Tullock, Corruption Theory and
Practice,CONTMIP. ECON. POL'Y, July 1996, at 6, 9-10. None of these articles, however, points
out the role of subjective information forcing in the tenure process. In one sentence, McKenzie
suggests that he may have been thinking along these lines, saying: "To induce prospective
faculty to exert the amount of effort necessary to be ability-revealing,universities must offer a
'prize' that potential recruits consider worth the effort." See McKenzie, supra at 337 (emphasis
added).

2006]

INFORM TION-FORCING DEVICES

basing an up-or-out tenure vote solely on citation counts and the number of articles
written.36 Indeed, we have colleagues who are outraged at the suggestion that citation
counts should be considered at all. Nonetheless, law schools and many other faculty
departments use a de facto two-round promotion system. Few assistant law professors
today receive tenure with only one scholarly piece published. Junior faculty must
produce a minimal number of articles and generate a minimum score on their teaching
evaluations in order to be seriously considered for tenure. 37 Once they have crossed
those minimum thresholds though, the evaluation becomes subjective. This is where
qualities such as the candidate's creativity, loyalty, and judgment are evaluated. 38

36. Given the current citation practices of legal academics, where it is not uncommon for
articles to cite hundreds, if not thousands, of sources with seemingly little quality control, it is
probably unwise to attach too much value to these counts. That said, we are also unwilling to
conclude that a citation count would have no predictive value in something like a promotion or
hiring decision. For example, we are willing to venture that it is likely that citation counts would
outperform some of the other criteria that are sometimes considered, such as class rank, law
school attended, prestige ofjudicial clerkship, or gut instinct. Citation counts may also be biased
towards certain groups and can be gamed by the various participants (for example, citation clubs
arise where scholars implicitly or explicitly agree to cite each other). Again, assuming equal
predictive power of the different criteria, the question should be whether these counts are more
or less biased than the others and whether those biases can be corrected. The biases inherent in
gut-instinct-based decisions, for example, are likely to be much harder to uncover and correct.
On possible bias in citations, see Nancy Levit, Defining Cutting Edge Scholarship:Feminism
and CriteriaofRationality, 71 CHI.-KENT L.REV.947,949-52 (1996); see also Daniel B. Klein
& Eric Chiang, The Social Science CitationIndex: A Black Box-With an IdeologicalBias?,1
ECON. J. WATCH 134, 137-39 (2004) (discussing bias in Social Science Citation Index (SSCI)
measures).
37. Note that the "tournament" for some junior faculty is simply a competition to achieve a
minimum quantity threshold and not a relative comparison with other faculty. So long as
achieving the quantity threshold both (a) creates a body of work and allows decision makers to
observe the process by which the junior faculty member goes about her research and (b) places
the junior faculty member under some degree of stress, such an absolute threshold may serve a
function similar to that served by a more relative tournament ranking. Indeed, absent external
shocks common to the production of articles, there is no need to run a tournament. A quantity
threshold works just as well. See supra note 2 (explaining the "common external shock"
justification for relative rankings). Although data on tenure standards for law schools is hard to
come by, our sense is that the quanity-of-article requirement is quite strict. For example, one of
us recently received a request for an outside tenure review from a prominent law school.
According to the letter, two articles-unless they were of exceptional quality-would not justify
tenure. At this school, the presumption was "against" tenure unless the junior scholar had
produced at least three articles.
38. Most academics agree that creativity is a desired characteristic. See Michael H.
Gottesman & Michael R. Seidl, A Tale of Two Discourses: William Gould's Journeyfrom the
Academy to the World of Politics, 47 STAN. L. REV. 749, 757 (1995) ("Like Socrates, good
academics are gadflies. A significant part of their business is to write, speak, and think
provocatively. A professor's prospects for publishing in elite journals depends in large part upon
writing something new and different. Tenure standards at the top institutions invariably require
that scholarship be original and creative."); William W. Van Alstyne, Academic Freedom and
the First Amendment in the Supreme Court of the United States: An UnhurriedHistorical
Review, L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1990, at 79, 87 ("A faculty, especially a research
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Requiring that candidates for tenure meet a first-round minimum threshold of
productivity (or produce more work than some fraction of their peers) provides the
incentive for untenured academics to produce the body of work necessary for a
meaningful second-round subjective evaluation oftheir academic abilities. This insight
about revelation tournaments does not reflect a preference for objective evidence over
subjective evidence. The argument is not that quantifiable things are the only things
that matter. Indeed, one could believe that quantity of scholarly production is
meaningless and still support including quantity as a necessary first-stage prerequisite.
It is simply that the effort to meet such objective criteria has the potential to force the
revelation of subjective traits.
1. Information Type
What kind of subjective traits are generated in a competition to produce scholarly
articles? If a candidate does produce a number of articles, this body of work gives the
evaluation committee not only the opportunity to count the number of articles and cites
to them, but an opportunity to observe both the candidate's creativity as embodied in
the articles and the process by which those articles were generated. Junior faculty
members attempting to write their first few pieces will often consult with other faculty
members, bouncing ideas off their colleagues. This process provides insights into how
a particular junior faculty member comes up with ideas and her future potential for new
ideas. A junior professor may believe that she has the capability of generating
innovative ideas before she starts a position as an untenured professor but learns, for
39
whatever reason, that she does not, through the "trial" assistant professorship period.
For some academics, a single path-breaking article and one stellar set of teaching
evaluations might be all that is needed to discover these qualities. Nonetheless, for the
majority of academics, a series of papers and evaluations will lead to a more precise
estimate of that scholar's potential.
Note that these traits--creativity, collegiality, drive-are all difficult to measure
through objective criteria. Such subjective qualities are also hard to convey credibly.
Who would believe the statement "I am very creative" without any articles or other
accomplishments to back up this assertion? Moreover, observing how a colleague
faculty, is employed professionally to test and propose revisions in the prevailing wisdom, not to
inculcate the prevailing wisdom in others, store it as monks might do, or rewrite it in elegant
detail. Its function is primarily one of critical review: to check conventional truth, to reexamine
('re-search') what may currently be thought sound but may be more or less unsound."). In fact,
one creative and innovative idea is valued far more than a dozen little extensions of other
people's
ideas.
See, e.g.,
Ronald
Coase,
Centennial Coase
Lecture,
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/events/coaselecture.html (last visited Aug. 28,2005) (describing
his academic career as largely consisting of two ideas); but see Daniel A. Farber, The Case
Against Brilliance, 70 MINN. L. REv. 917 (1986) (arguing that the trend towards valuing
"novelty, surprise, and unconventionality" in economic and legal theory is problematic).
Nonetheless, a preliminary question that is asked at the initial stage in almost every tenure
decision is not about creativity, but rather quantity: "How many articles has she published?"
This question is asked even though everyone agrees that the sheer quantity of articles is far from
being the most important criterion for promotion.
39. Whether the untenured professor voluntarily reveals this subjective information to the
promotion committee, however, is a different question, to which the answer is often "no" in the
absence of some information-revelation tournament.
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performs under "high stress" (such as may be experienced when under the shadow of
an upcoming tenure decision) provides salient information on drive and willingness to
cut comers in research. On the other hand, high stress may also provide information on
how willing a professor is to maintain collegiality (attending workshops, commenting
on papers, etc.) even when under tight time constraints. The subjective nature of the
important criteria, the difficulty candidates may experience in communicating these
traits credibly, and the importance of high stress in flushing out evidence of subjective
traits, make the tenure decision a fruitful area for the employment of a revelation
tournament.
2. Nature of Decision Makers
Tenured law professors typically make the tenure decisions regarding junior faculty.
While many universities require central campus approval, most faculty decisions are
accepted without question. Law professors making a decision on one of their own
possess the expertise to assess the quality of scholarship, collegiality, and scholarly
drive of a potential tenure candidate. Moreover, law professors, acting as agents of the
law school and the university, have discretion in determining whether a candidate for
tenure is "best" for the law school. While putatively supporting a candidate on the
basis of merit, the danger exists that a particular faculty member may have ulterior
motives, and this support may run counter to the overall goals of the law school. An
example would be the promotion of a candidate with questionable academic abilities
but sterling political credentials. A senior faculty member's exploitation of her position
in order to derive private benefits would be another example. The greater the discretion
senior faculty enjoy, the greater is the incentive for junior faculty to engage in wasteful
favor-currying activities. Such activities could include gratuitous citations, even where
the senior colleague's work is only tangentially relevant. Or, worse, the young faculty
member might build on the work of a senior colleague, even when that work is not
worth building on. In the same vein, junior faculty might praise the work of senior
faculty in a workshop, fearing the consequences of revealing the shortcomings of a
paper produced by the senior colleague. Finally, junior faculty might spend time hiding
40
their political preferences.
A revelation tournament may help reveal the hidden motivations of a particular
faculty member in supporting the tenure case for a junior professor. Those senior
faculty who support a junior faculty member because of that person's political views or
skill in currying favor (as opposed to academic merit) may contend that the junior
professor, though lacking a long academic track record, has academic potential and a
capacity for creativity. Of course, other faculty may receive such claims with a degree
of skepticism, though in the absence of any definitive body of work, it is difficult to
directly refute such claims. When junior faculty are forced to meet a minimum quantity
threshold, however, the emerging information on creativity, collegiality, and

40. Note that the difference between the collegial faculty environment and an environment
where junior faculty spend time currying favor is not clear. In a less pejorative light, some might
characterize the activities described above as showing "respect" for senior colleagues. And a
work environment full of respected and respectful colleagues is more conducive to the
production of knowledge. Respect, in other words, builds an intellectual community.
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thoroughness of research will make it more difficult for supporters to make such broadbased claims.
B. Applying the Revelation Tournament to JudicialNominations
Most candidates for elevation to the Supreme Court have had prior judicial
experience. 4' Yet, in making promotion decisions, we largely ignore the information
that exists about their prior judicial performance, data that could be used to structure a
promotion tournament.42 Why do we ignore this potentially useful information? Even if
we do not believe that the judge with the largest number of citations or opinions written
should become the next Supreme Court Justice, favoring candidates with such
attributes in the first round of competition will induce more judges to produce judicial
opinions (and strive to write opinions that others will cite). Congress and the general
public may use these opinions to get a better sense of the views and judicial decisionmaking capabilities of a particular candidate for the high Court. As best we know, no
President or senator has ever made a serious attempt to set out objective criteria on
judicial performance and then collect the necessary empirical evidence on the matter.43
Instead, many experts assert that Justices should be chosen based on temperament,
empathy, and fairness-qualities that they say are unrepresented by an objective
evaluation of the nominee's influence as a circuit court judge. 44
In earlier work, two of us proposed using three categories of objective criteria for
promotion to the Supreme Court: productivity, reputation, and independence.45 For
circuit court judges, the number of published opinions (corrected for intercircuit
differences) provides an objective method of ranking judges based on productivity.
Objective proxies also exist for reputation among other judges, including the number
of times a judge's opinions are cited outside of the judge's circuit and the number of
times other judges invoke the judge by name in their opinions. Finally, for rankings
based on independence, one possible objective measure is to track how often a
particular judge dissents (or is dissented against) where the opposing judge is ajudge

41. See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew D. Martin, The Norm of PriorJudicial
Experience and Its Consequencesfor CareerDiversity on the US. Supreme Court,91 CAL. L.
REv. 905, 909-17 (2003) (noting and then criticizing the fact that most Supreme Court
nominees come from the pool of lower circuit court judges).
42. Stephen Choi &Mitu Gulati, Choosingthe Next Supreme CourtJustice:An Empirical
Ranking of JudicialPerformance,78 S. CAL. L. REv. 23 (2005).
43. For an extended discussion of the subject, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 4, at 305.
44. For examples of articles critiquing the judicial tournament idea because it does not
measure intangibles such as collegiality, justice, and fairness, see Stephen Goldberg, Judicial
Promotionsand the Heisman Trophy, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005); William P.

Marshall, Be Careful What You Wishfor: The Problemswith EmpiricalRankings as a Method
to Select Supreme Court Justices, 78 S. CAL. L. REv. 119 (2004); John V. Orth, Judging the
Tournament,JURIST, Apr. 15, 2004, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forum/symposium-jc/choi-gulatiorth-taha.php (symposium on judicial selection). For an extensive discussion of what qualities
make for a good Supreme Court nominee, see Michael Gerhardt, Merit versus Ideology, 26
CARDozo. L. REv. 353 (2005).
45. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 4, at 305-12.
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associated with another political party, that is, the party of the President who appointed
the judge.46
1. Information Type
The three objective categories of merit for Supreme Court nomination are coarse
measures of what many consider important factors in the selection of a great Supreme
Court Justice. They fail to capture important elements of good judging, elements such
as judgment, fairness, empathy, temperament, and the ability to forge a consensus. 47
Nonetheless, the very act of writing opinions will generate information on the views of
a particular judge. A judge with strong views will find it difficult to mask these views
across a large number of decisions involving issues that relate to these views (such as
gun control, abortion, and so on). Creating a first-selection round for nomination to the
high Court-one that will cull out most of those judges who do not score highly on the
objective criteria-would create an incentive for judges to leave a paper trail that
would be useful in assessing the arguably more important subjective qualities.
One could respond that a tournament is not necessary to learn about a judge's
subjective qualities. Even the least productive circuit court judge, for example, may
produce enough of a track record during the first year on the bench to assess her
subjective judgment and ideological tendencies. We disagree with this assessment of
the relationship between, on the one hand, the level of effort made by judges (and their
productivity), and on the other hand the production of information useful in assessing
the subjective criteria important to the selection of a Supreme Court Justice. In the
absence of a tournament structure, circuit court judges have an incentive, even over a
long period of time, to avoid creating a high profile by dealing with controversial
matters. Instead of focusing onjob performance, those judges seeking promotion may
divert their energies to engaging in tasks that please individual senators-tasks such as
serving on committees in which particular senators take an interest--or attending fund
raisers for specific causes.
In contrast, a tournament puts judges under pressure to generate published opinions,
dissents, and citations. Citations would be a particularly important aspect of the
tournament for judges. The desire to receive more citations would drive judges to seek
higher-profile, more controversial matters. Ajudge's opinion in a high-profile case, in
turn, is more likely to reveal subjective information on the judgment, wisdom, and
ideology of a particular judge. As a judge accumulates more "high-judgment" events,
politicians and the general public have more information with which to assess whether
the judge makes judicial decisions in an effective manner. Put differently, the rat race
forces people to make judgment calls on difficult matters-and that reveals information
about key subjective attributes.

46. See Choi &Gulati, supra note 42, at 40-68 (providing a ranking based on productivity,
reputation, and independence for federal circuit court judges based on opinions authored from
1998-2000).
47. See Goldberg, supra note 44 (asserting the importance of these types of subjective
attributes); Marshall, supra note 44 (similar); Gerhardt, supra note 44 (similar).
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2. Nature of Decision Makers
Why, then, do we not see a revelation tournament or the use of objective measures
in the area of Supreme Court nominations? One possible reason is that a principalagent problem exists between politicians (the agents) and the voting public (the
principals). Politicians, whether due to interest-group pressures or other reasons, often
have views about what constitutes a strong judicial candidate. Some views are widely
held, such as a preference for judges who work hard and are competent and intelligent
(call these "merit-related" factors). Others are less widely held, such as views that a
judge should support abortion rights or gun control (call these "ideology factors"). Our
apprehension is that politicians may praise a candidate for the high court as the most
qualified person for the job when, in fact, the true motivation behind this assessment
may depend on more ideological preferences (e.g., on abortion rights).
We suspect that politicians, in order to keep subjective information about individual
candidates hidden, tend to reject the use of objective measures that may generate
information on a particular candidate. Rather than select candidates based on a long
track record (useful in determining subjective characteristics), politicians may
purposely seek out candidates with little or no record.48 Without a record, the public
finds it difficult to assess merit, and nominators can easily make a claim of merit for
the person of their choice. Politicians may also prefer a system where judges seeking
promotion have to curry favor as opposed to one where judges focus on performing
according to generally accepted objective criteria.
A revelation tournament would place greater emphasis on merit and less on
ideology (or the currying of favor). Our objective measures, at first blush, would seem
to give an advantage to those who do well on productivity, citation acquisition, and the
willingness to write independently. They do, but only insofar as they create the pool of
possible candidates. In round two of the revelation tournament, the politicians (and
members of the public) may then use the subjective information generated from the
competition in the first round to assess the subjective characteristics of the candidates.
If the tournament's first round provides politicians who subscribe to some narrowly
held ideological viewpoint information that is useful to them in determining whether a
particular judge may favor the same viewpoint, the first round also provides that
information to other politicians holding opposing viewpoints, as well as to the general
public. Assuming these ideological viewpoints are in fact narrowly held, the revelation
that a judge has been nominated based on these viewpoints may undermine the public's
support for the candidate. While authoring a large number of opinions may get a judge
through the first stage of a judicial nomination tournament, the body of those same
opinions may doom that judge in the second stage if it reveals an unpopular ideological
bent in the judge's opinions (or other flaws from the perspective of the public, such as
having a lack of empathy for the human condition, as some have characterized at least
one prominent and highly productive circuit court judge). Without the revelation
tournament, there is an incentive for both the candidate and her political sponsors to
hide the facts. With the revelation tournament, they are forced to reveal the facts.

48. See, e.g., Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Battle Over Judgeship Tests Congressman'sLoyalties to
People and Party, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2003, at A14 (noting that Miguel Estrada, Bush
nominee to the D.C. Circuit, had "published little that would hint at his judicial philosophy").
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While a normative argument exists for a revelation tournament in the area of
Supreme Court nominations, there are arguments on the other side. In the case of
judicial promotions, a revelation tournament may help reveal information on the
preferences of politicians in championing a particular candidate for judicial
nomination. This revelation of the preferences of a politician-agent will, however, do
little good if the principals (the voting public) are unable to distinguish between
accurate information generated on a politician's preferences and manufactured
information designed to confuse and lull the public into supporting the politician's
nomination choice. We think this risk remote in the context of judicial promotions.
While the voting public is dispersed, several intermediaries (such as newspapers,
political commentators, and so on) are well placed to decipher the information
generated by a tournament on the subjective qualities of a judicial nominee and the
political leanings of the politicians who support (and oppose) the nominee. The public
nature of a Supreme Court nomination in particular, when combined with competition
among such intermediaries, would mitigate the effect of manufactured information.
Simply claiming "my candidate is the best"-even repeatedly-will not carry much
weight in the face of respected intermediaries providing concise and credible analysis
of a nominee's judicial track record. We are less optimistic about the ability of
dispersed consumers to digest information in the context of law school rankings, as
discussed below.
C. Applying the Revelation Tournament to Law School Rankings
Each year, law students, prospective law students, deans, professors, and alumni
wait in anticipation of the U.S. News & World Report ("U.S. News") law school
rankings. Many law school deans have publicly condemned these rankings. In 1998,
John Sexton, then dean of New York University School of Law, stated: "I hope that
U.S. News will think about whether the profits generated by its rankings are purchased
at too great a cost to its own journalistic integrity." He went on to call the rankings
"misleading and dangerous." 49 The Association ofAmerican Law Schools (AALS) has
issued statements challenging the U.S. News methodology, its findings, and the very act
of ranking law schools. 50 Scholars who study the ranking methodology note its many

49. Press Release, Ass'n of Am. L. Sch., Association of American Law Schools Calls on
U.S. News & World Report to Stop Ranking Law Schools; Study Challenges Validity of
Magazine's System (Feb. 18, 1998), available at http://www.aals.org/ranknews.html.
50. In February 1998, the AALS sent a letter to 93,000 law school applicants, entitled Law
School Rankings May Be Hazardous to Your Health.Numerous deans endorsed this letter. The
thrust of the letter is that rankings are misguided, uninformative, and misleading. LAW SCHOOL
DEANS SPEAK OUT ABouT RANKINGS (Law School Admission Council 2005), available at
http://www.lsac.org/pdfs/2005-2006/RANKING2005-newer.pdf. The letter states that "[t]he
idea that all law schools can be measured by the same yardstick ignores the qualities that make
you and law schools unique, and is unworthy of being an important influence on the choice you
are about to make. As the deans of schools that range across the spectrum of several rating
systems, we strongly urge you to minimize the influence of rankings on your own judgment."
Before it sent the letter, the AALS commissioned a study of the US. News rankings. The study
concluded that "[t]here are many serious problems with the US. News system for evaluating law
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failings: 51for instance, that the measure is biased in favor of private schools over public
schools.
Despite this public protest, condemnation, and ridicule, US. News sells. Potential
law students rely on the rankings in selecting law schools. Law school alumni celebrate
upward movement in the ranking of their school and care when their school falls from
the top 10, from the top 50, or out of the second tier. Even at top schools, students
convene town hall meetings and write op-ed pieces in the student newspapers when the
school's ranking slips. Finally, many law professors look to US. News when deciding
which student journal-from among the hundreds of such journals-to submit an
article.
The US. News rankings are an example of an objective measure that presents
problems. U.S. News doesn't accurately measure what law students and employers are
looking for: the quality of a legal education. Perhaps measuring the quality of a legal
education is impossible. But the fact that the ranking is imperfect, imprecise, or just
plain bad is not enough to jettison its use. If the ranking forces revelation of otherwise
hard-to-obtain information about law schools, the objective ranking has value. In other
words, the question is not whether the U.S. News rankings measure the quality of a
legal education, but whether U.S. News's ranking process has important informationforcing attributes.52
Before U.S. News, most schools did not share information about faculty scholarship
and hiring, the bar-passage rate and employment status ofrecent graduates, the number
of books in their libraries, or student-faculty ratios.53 This information was available
only to potential students and others in the academic community who sought it out. For
schools." STEPHEN P. KLEIN & LAURA HAMILTON, THE VALIDITY OF THE U.S. NEWS AND WORLD

REPORT RANKING OF ABA LAW SCHOOLS (1998), http://www.aals.org/validity.html.

51. See Brian Leiter, Measuringthe Academic Distinction ofLaw Faculties,29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 451, 452 (2000) (listing the flaws in the U.S. News rankings).

52. We are not the first to suggest that law school rankings might be useful, even if they fail
to measure educational quality. Russell Korobkin has argued that rankings coordinate highability students with employers as well as each other. Russell Korobkin, In Praise of Law
School Rankings: Solutions to Coordinationand Collective Action Problems,77 TEx. L. REv.
403 (1998). To see this, first note that higher-ranked schools tend to be more selective. The
argument, then, is that high-ability students choose more selective schools to distinguish
themselves from low-ability students. Such signaling works-even when the higher-ranked
schools offer no educational benefit-so long as lower-ability students find it harder to get into

these higher-ranked schools. Id.
at 409-10. In effect, rankings separate students according to a
criterion that employers care about: natural talent. As a result, the most selective employers
recruit at the most selective schools. According to Korobkin, the rankings coordinate employers

and students whether they are "based on unimpeachable data or cotton candy." Id. at 410. In
Korobkin's account, rankings force information from the law student-whether she possesses
high or low ability-to the employer. The low-ability student, because she failed to get into the

more selective school, has trouble convincing the most selective employers that she is truly a
high-ability student. This, however, is not the only information-forcing that the rankings
provide.
53. See Paul L. Caron & Rafael Gely, What Law Schools CanLearnfrom Billy Beane and
the Oakland Athletics, 82 TEx. L. REV. 1483, 1508 (2004) ("By eliminating, or at least
substantially limiting, competition among law schools, the AALS eliminated incentives to
measure the success of a law school. To the extent that all law schools offered the same courses,
taught by faculty with similar credentials, using the same methods, it became more difficult to

identify 'winners' and 'losers."').
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obvious reasons, schools that fared poorly on these measures did not publicize the fact;
schools that anticipated a poor performance did not bother to collect the data at all. In
the case of schools that performed well according to a variety of measures of school
quality, we suspect that, prior to the U.S. News rankings, there was a social norm in the
law school community against public bragging.
However, to say that the U.S. News rankings may be supported as a type of
revelation tournament does not necessarily justify the rankings. Consider how the U.S.
News rankings fare according to several criteria we identify as important to the
determination of the value and success of a revelation tournament.
1. Information Type
Because of our hypothesized social norm against bragging and the reluctance of
poorly performing schools to publicize data, much information about law schools
remained hidden before the U.S. News rankings broke the norm. As a result of these
rankings, otherwise hard-to-obtain information flowed into the market. Although
poorly conceived from a methodological standpoint, the rankings provide each school
with an excuse to gather information about its law school and publicize it. 54 Schools
that do poorly in the US. News rankings have an incentive to explain publicly why they
are in fact better than their objective rankings would suggest.
Importantly, the additional information revealed on law school quality is not the
type that may be generated only in high-stress, competitive situations. Rather, in
determining quality, consumers of a legal education may care about the ability of law
schools to train students to be quality attorneys and place them in good jobs. Direct
objective measures exist to measure this quality, including data on the percentage of
law students who are still employed one, two, or ten years and so on after graduation.

54. The success of US. News generated an important second-order effect. It created a space
for others to improve on the U.S. News rankings methodology and produce alternate and
arguably better rankings. In other words, the combination of imperfect rankings by a first mover
and a high demand for these rankings produces a market for alternate rankings. Competitors
seek to improve on the first set of rankings by collecting better information and analyzing it
better. So, in the business school context, this competition has produced alternate rankings from
magazines and newspapers such as Fortune, Business Week, the Wall Street Journal,and the
Financial Times. There is a similar vigorous competition in the market for college rankings
(even though this predated US. News).
The point is simple: the social value of an imperfect but successful ranking venture by an
outsider such as US. News is that it produces a competition among different rankers, each of
whom now tries to improve on the methodology of the others. In the law school context, we
have not seen other periodicals such as the American Lawyer or Legal Affairs take up the US.
News challenge and produce alternative rankings-and we might ask why not-but we have
seen individuals such as Brian Leiter engage in precisely the competitive dynamic that we
describe. He has not only unpacked and critiqued the US. News methodology, but also has
attempted to improve on it while producing his own rankings of the law schools. The Leiter
rankings, descriptions of methodology, and critique of the US. News's ranking methodology are
available at Leiter's Law School Rankings, http://www.leiterrankings.com (last visited Nov. 18,
2005). There have also been other attempts to rank law schools such as that by Thomas
Brennan. Thomas E. Brennan, Judging the Law Schools, http://www.ilrg.com/rankings/ (last
visited Aug. 28, 2005).
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Thus, there is nothing particular to the competitive environment engendered within a
revelation tournament that is necessary to bring such information to light. A first-stage
law school ranking tournament may generate existing information that is based on an
objective metric such as employment statistics and that is both verifiable and capable
of producing rankings. Designing a one-stage tournament that takes into account these
existing factors may provide a superior ranking (at lower cost) than a revelation
tournament.
Of course, some less verifiable, more subjective information may emerge from the
competition between law schools hoping to place well in the U.S. News rankings. For
example, the U.S. News competition has likely pushed a number of schools to cheat on
the numbers that they submit to U.S. News. 55 The competition has thus generated
information on the willingness of schools to cheat. Nonetheless, consumers ofrankings
cannot easily observe which schools cheat-that is, the revelation tournament is not
particularly effective. Indeed, it is not at all clear that this information about law
schools' (or their deans') willingness to cheat is salient to the prospective students and
other consumers at issue. In the absence of a specific need to generate subjective,
otherwise hard-to-obtain information outside a competitive, high-stress environment,
the argument for a revelation tournament is weak.
2. Nature of Decision Makers
In the case of the U.S. News ranking of law schools, the ultimate decision makerslaw students, law schools, law professors, and so on-may lack the ability to
distinguish among the myriad of news releases and information generated by schools
attempting to appear better than their peers. And they, especially prospective students,
are even less able to detect when schools are cheating to enhance their rankings. In
addition, even assuming some ability to evaluate the information, dispersed consumers
of the rankings may lack full incentives to evaluate the information that is revealed. In
other words, there is a collective action problem. In the law firm setting, as we saw, the
partnership may actively encourage a first-stage tournament based on easy-to-measure
indices of performance as a means of eliciting information for a more detailed and
subjective analysis of potential partnership candidates. The law firm partnership
benefits from overturning an objective measurement of quality based on the results of a
more subjective, second-stage analysis. Among consumers of the U.S. News rankings,
there is no such coordination. No single consumer realizes the full benefit to the group
of all consumers
from assessing any additional information revealed through the
56
tournament.

55. Brian Leiter, for example, has written in depth on how schools may game the numbers
in the US. News rankings. See Leiter's Law School Rankings, The U.S. News Law School
Rankings: A Guide for the Perplexed (May 2003), http://www.leiterrankings.com/
usnews/guide.shtml.
56. Relying on revelation to generate additional information may further exacerbate the
collective action problem. Some schools may put out more employment statistics while others
will distribute additional information on grades, thus undermining comparability. Lacking a
common standard for comparison, dispersed potential students and others may find it even more
difficult to assess the importance of any additional information revealed as a consequence of the
US. News competition.

2006]

INFORMA TION-FORCING DEVICES

Intermediaries with an incentive to promote a second-stage information revelation
phase of the tournament are also absent in the law school ranking environment. U.S.
News, for example, does not internalize the full benefits from obtaining an accurate
ranking of law schools. US. News is an external player, an outsider, who seized a gap
in the market. The rankings may be highly flawed, but there has been customer demand
for them. U.S. News (and other potential providers of objective ranking measures)
profit increasingly as more consumers focus attention on their rankings even to the
exclusion of any potential second-stage revelation of subjective information relevant to
rankings. To the extent such subjective measures are hard to quantify and include in the
US. News rankings, U.S. News has no incentive to direct the attention of consumers
away from its own objective measures and toward such subjective measures. While
other intermediaries exist in the market to provide alternative rankings (such as Brian
Leiter at the University of Texas Law School), these intermediaries lack the standing
and broad reach of US. News.
In such a case, the information revelation characteristic of the US. News rankings
may do little more than raise the level of noise about the quality of different schools.
Rather than focus on revealing additional, more subjective information that might
counter misperceptions caused by an inaccurate objective ranking, schools may instead
focus on gaming the system to improve their objective standing. For example, to
increase their prestige ranking, schools send out glossy flyers and alumni magazines to
every law school professor in the country. These mailings detail recent hires, workshop
series, endowed lectures, and faculty productivity. More perniciously, to increase the
number of applications and hence appear more selective, some law schools supposedly
waive the application fee. And to increase employment figures, there are schools who
are rumored to hire recent graduates as research assistants. The collective action
problem facing consumers of US. News in deciphering the subjective information
learned from such gaming and the lack of intermediaries tabulating such subjective
information results in few informational benefits from the gaming. The devotion of
resources to these gaming effects, as a result, likely outweighs any informational
benefits created by the revelation tournament.
CONCLUSION

This paper makes three claims. First, competition based on objective measures can,
under certain conditions, force out information on hard-to-observe subjective
characteristics. Specifically, the revelation tournament provides a mechanism for both
information revelation and information generation. Looked at in this way, the
revelation tournament justifies the presence of otherwise hard-to-explain vague and
fuzzy promotion standards.
Second, decision makers who want to advance their own agenda at the expense of
the principals might reject the revelation tournament. To bolster the rejection, these
decision makers may claim that the objective criteria fail to capture what is really
important, but not measured. In light of the information-forcing attributes discussed
above, such claims about the limits of objective criteria should be treated with
suspicion.
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Third, in common with tournaments more generally, revelation tournaments have
limitations. The value of a revelation tournament diminishes if(1 ) decision makers are
not sophisticated or lack motivation to use the information the tournament generates, or
(2) competition over objective criteria fails to generate meaningful information on the
subjective traits of interest.

